24 done so … fresh out of the starting blocks [this] demonstrates a lack of understanding.” [52] The appellant advanced two main grounds of appeal against his convictions. Apart from that relating to the two assaults, his essential contention was that the trial court had misdirected itself in not proceeding from the premise that the merits should have been determined within the context of the practice of ukuthwala, or customary marriage. It was submitted that “consent” within the practice of ukuthwala is a concept that must be determined in accordance with the rightful place which customary law has in our constitutional dispensation, because it is an integral part of ukuthwala that the “bride” may not only be coerced, but will invariably pretend to object (in various ways) since it is required, or at least expected, of her to do so. As the appellant’s counsel put it in his heads of argument: ‘[This] informs the intention of the male and the most relevant factor in terms of Xhosa custom [is] whether the sexual violation of the female is criminal or a sanctioned form of coercion…depending on the permutation the consent of the female [is] irrelevant…’ [53] Insofar as the two convictions for assault are concerned, it was submitted on behalf of the appellant that, even if his version was to be rejected, the convictions themselves amounted to a splitting of charges, given that both assaults took place as part and parcel of one “overall” assault to compel the complainant to submit to sexual intercourse.