23 him that she wished to leave and he would not have stood in her way. [49] The trial court accepted that even on the appellant’s version he knew that he had no right to force the complainant into anything against her will, which effectively put paid to any doubt being cast on his mens rea given the court’s acceptance of the complainant’s version. [50] The appellant’s sister-in-law was found to be a lying witness whose evidence, along with that of the appellant, was rejected as patently false. The appellant was thus convicted on the counts to which we have referred. Appeal against conviction [51] The appellant thus raised as one of his defences and grounds of appeal to the charges of trafficking and the rapes, that he was in a customary marriage with the complainant at the time of the incidents. The magistrate was however of the view that the matter was not about “…the practice of ukuthwala or forced arranged marriages and its place if any, in our Constitutional Democracy. Rather, this case is about whether the state proved that the accused committed the offences he is charged with and if so whether he acted with the knowledge of wrongfulness and the required intent. To this extent only, reference to the so-called marriage will be made from time to time.” On appeal the appellant contended that the approach adopted by the magistrate to the relevance of customary law amounted to a misdirection and that “…having