55 [97] Insofar as the two convictions for assault are concerned, it is our view that these amount to a duplication of convictions. In S v BM 2014 (2) SACR 23 (SCA) at para [3] the relevant test was formulated as follows: ‘It is apparent that charging Mr BM with two separate counts, arising out of what was clearly one and the same incident, involved an improper duplication (splitting) of charges. It has been a rule of practice in our criminal courts since at least 1887 that “where the accused has committed only one offence in substance, it should not be split up and charged against him in one and the same trial as several offences”. The test is whether, taking a common sense view of matters in the light of fairness to the accused, a single offence or more than one has been committed. The purpose of the rule is to prevent a duplication of convictions on what is essentially a single offence and, consequently, the duplication of punishment. Its operation is well illustrated by the example given in R v Kuzwayo, of the theft of 10 apples from an orchard on one occasion, where there is only a single offence, and the theft of one apple a day over 10 days, where there are 10 offences. Here, if there were an offence it was patently a single offence committed with a single intention. It should not have been split into two charges.’ [98] On the complainant’s own version, the assaults with the mop handle and the belt took place because the appellant wanted to subdue her so that he could rape her. The assaults themselves were the precursor to that rape. They immediately preceded the rape. As such the assaults arose out of the same incident as that of the rape. We thus conclude that the assaults formed part of a single offence, namely rape, committed with a single intention. To uphold the convictions on these two counts would amount to a duplication of convictions