52 attempt to do was to rely on the aberrant form of ukuthwala as being the living form of customary law to justify his conduct. [91] In clarification of the relevance of the appellant’s reliance on the practice of ukuthwala in customary law, the trial court had specifically put to De Villiers that the appellant had not asserted any right under customary law to have married or to have had sexual intercourse with the complainant without her consent, nor to have removed her from the Eastern Cape to Cape Town against her will. De Villiers’ response is fully encapsulated in the following concluding remarks he made in his testimony; “---Net hoe simpatiek ʼn mens ook al wil wees ten opsigte van tradisionele lewende gewoontereg mag mens nooit romantiseer daaroor soos wat soms ʼn bietjie gedoen word nie en moet mens gedagtig wees dat die waardigheid en gelykheidsbeginsels van die Grondwet so belangrik is dat selfs die Konstitusionele Hof onlangs in sy meerderheidsuitspraak gesê het ʼn man moet vir sy eerste vrou se toestemming by haar kry voordat hy sy tweede vrou mag trou. So die vrou se toestemming word baie vooropgestel en dit is iets wat in hierdie geval ongelukkig miskien nie gebeur het nie.” [92] The trial court found and correctly so, that the appellant had not asserted any customary law precept to have justified his conduct, or that he had acted in the belief that he had entered into a customary marriage that permitted sexual coercion. It appeared however on appeal that the appellant re-asserted a reliance on the practice of ukuthwala, albeit in its aberrant form, which was permissive of coercion in respect of the sexual assaults to subdue her, and