NGCOBO J provisions). The child complainant was about 13 years old when she testified. No application was made to lead her evidence through an intermediary, nor did the trial court enquire into the desirability of the appointing of an intermediary. The question whether an intermediary should have been appointed in the light of the provisions of section 28(2) of the Constitution therefore arose on the facts. It may therefore have been appropriate for the High Court to raise the issue of the validity of sections 170A(1) and 170A(7). Whether a decision on the constitutional validity was necessary to confirm the conviction of Mr Phaswane is another matter. In view of the conclusion that I reach in the next question, it is not necessary to reach any firm conclusion in this regard. [51] However, it is not clear how the oath provision (section 164(1)) arose on the facts. As pointed out earlier, the child was questioned by the court to establish whether she understood the import of an oath and, secondly, whether she understood the difference between truth and falsehood. The court was not satisfied that the child understood the import of the oath, but was satisfied that the child knew what it meant to speak the truth. The child was therefore admonished to speak the truth. On these facts, the question whether the provisions of section 164(1) exclude from testifying a child who does not understand the difference between truth and falsehood simply did not arise. [52] Nor did the in camera provisions (section 153(3) and (5)) arise. The proceedings were held in camera. This issue was raised by the trial court in view of 27