e) The national supreme court has erred in revising the sentence to a more severe sentence, unless the accused had appeared before the court in the appeal phase of the trials to present his alibies and defense according to article (209) of the civil procedures of 1983, before passing the sentence and revising the sentence against the accused in the criminal cases. f) The Supreme Court would have denied the accused his constitutional right and would have erred, and the sentence would have to be revoked or cancelled if the Supreme Court has indicted the accused or revised the sentences against him with another crime, without hearing his defense or allowing him the right of defending such a charge. It is clear to us, according to these constitutional laws regarding free trial and the right of defence, that the procedure that the Supreme Court shall follow as the final court is to allow the accused the chance to respond on the matter, should it involve a request to revise the sentence to a much severe punishment, or to revise a release charge with a decision requesting the review of the procedures to review the indictment for a crime whose sentence could reach the death penalty or life imprisonment, like the case in front of us. According to these constitutional rights, we have decided “to notify the indicted person” to respond to the appeal to grant him his right of “response” in the appeal phase to establish procedural justice according to instructions of the constitutional court, especially that the appeal did not appear before us (the accusation) under article (45) paragraph (J) and he had been notified to respond to the appeal, but failed to do so. Therefore, we have decided to hold the procedure to address the case. Second: As to the subject of the appeal, we are of the opinion: 1. There is no argument on applying the provisions of the Child Act of 2010 to the case presented to us, because the victim was born in 2007 2. There are no arguments regarding the facts of the accusation a) The accused had imposed sexual intercourse upon the victim according to her statements b) All circumstantial evidence points to the fact that the accused has been in privacy with the victim and he testifies to the same c) The medical examination report stated that there were traces of semen on both the accused and the victims’ cloth which were taken into custody at the time of the incident after both accused and victim have been detained and there were also clear traces of semen on the genital organs d) All facts and circumstances support, without a doubt, the victim’s statements that a sexual encounter had been performed. The part which the criminal court and the appeal court have both missed is exhibit (1) which stated: “The hymen has been damaged” And it is clear that the argument on this case concern this one fact: Is the fact that “the hymen had been damaged” a conclusive fact that such damage is the result of sexual behaviour (penetration) that damages the female organs, which amounts to adultery, judging by the location of the violation? Is the fact “the hymen has been removed” with the 3