MOKGORO J [86] In both S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso127 and in Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa; Matiso v. Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison128, this Court declined to suspend invalidity on the basis that there would be no resultant lacuna after the impugned legislation had been struck down. 129 In both instances, this Court held that the legislation that would remain undisturbed on the books after the offending provisions had been struck would suffice to protect the legitimate objectives of the law.130 [87] Of course, the 1974 Act may itself be unconstitutional, as urged by Applicants. However, for the reasons stated, I have declined to anticipate that question here. If the constitutionality of the 1974 Act is raised in proceedings before us, that will be the time to consider whether it is destined to meet the same fate as the provision struck down today, and if so, whether its immediate demise would open the floodgates to pornography. This Court will decide then whether or not circumstances warrant making an order pursuant to the proviso to section 98(5). 127 1995(12) BCLR 1579 (CC). 128 1995(10) BCLR 1382 (CC). 129 See also Ferreira v Levin NO; Vryenhoek v Powell NO 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) 94 (declining to grant order under proviso to § 98(5) where declaration of invalidity would have “insignificant, if any, impact” on relevant sections of Companies Act. 130 In Bhulwana the Court found that the impugned presumption created by § 21(1)(a)(i) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act of 1992 was “not necessary for the conviction of offenders, or for the furthering of the objects of the legislation.” Id. para 30 (per O’Regan, J.) In Coetzee, striking down provisions allowing for the imprisonment, in certain circumstances, of civil debtors, the Court held that “it is by no means so that the system is dependent upon the imprisonment sanction for its viability. There are a number of other aids to judgment debt collection in the system, e.g., property attachment and garnishment of wages”. Id. para 18 (per Kriegler, J.) In Bhulwana, the Court noted further that “[c]entral to a consideration of the interests of Justice in a particular case is that successful litigants should obtain the relief they seek. . . In principal too, the litigants before the court should not be singled out for the grant of relief, but relief should be afforded to all people who are in the same situation as the litigants.” Id. para 32 (per O’Regan, J.) In light of our conclusion that no significant considerations impel in favour of suspension of invalidity in the present case, it is unnecessary to analyse the interests of the Applicants and those similarly situated in casu. 49