MOKGORO J statement” to include “incitement or encouragement” of members of the public to attend certain gatherings. The Court agreed with the applicants’ submission that this part of the definition was so widely constructed that it exceeded what Parliament could possibly have intended: There is no conceivable object related to the purposes set forth in . . . the Act which could be served by prohibiting the incitement or encouragement of people to attend or take part in gatherings which they may lawfully attend or in which they may lawfully take part . . . In the premises we are satisfied that [this part] of the definition of “subversive” statement is ultra vires and consequently void.89 [52] Mindful of the precedents available in our own law, as well as of the Canadian experience in testing for overbreadth under the aegis of the limitations clause, I now turn to an examination of the statutory provisions challenged in the present case. It is common cause in this matter that certain categories of pornographic material may constitutionally be subjected to state regulation. Most commonly singled out as legitimately subject to such regulation was pornography involving the exploitation of women and children, in contexts of violence, degradation and victimisation. [53] But it was also agreed that the challenged provision includes within its reach material that is constitutionally protected: Ms. Fedler, appearing for amici curiae People Opposing Women Abuse, et al., conceded that the provision unjustifiably and unreasonably interferes with protected categories of expression. Counsel for the Christian Lawyers Association readily acknowledged that there is no place for a provision that outlaws all depictions of homosexuality and lesbianism. And counsel for the Attorney-General conceded that the Act amounted to a “loaded shot gun” with which the government that promoted the Act intended to “hit everything”. Indeed, no one before 89 Id. 325-26. Although the Appellate Division reversed the NPD’s decision in Staatspresident en Andere v United Democratic Front en ‘n Ander, 1988 (4) SA 830 (A), the fundamental principle for which the case is here cited was not contested. 30

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