MOKGORO J is a sine qua non for every person’s right to realise her or his full potential as a human being, free of the imposition of heteronomous power. Viewed in that light, the right to receive others’ expressions has more than merely instrumental utility, as a predicate for the addressee’s meaningful exercise of her or his own rights of free expression. It is also foundational to each individual’s empowerment to autonomous self-development. 38 [27] We must understand the right embodied in section 15 not in isolation, but as part of a web of mutually supporting rights enumerated in the Constitution, 39 including the right to “freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion”, the right to privacy, and the right to dignity.40 Ultimately, all of these rights together may be conceived as underpinning an entitlement to It is also worth noting that the truth-seeking rationale for freedom of expression has been sharply criticised as tending to project uncritically onto the jurisprudential debate an idealised conception of free economic market relations. See Chaskalson et al., Constitutional Law of South Africa (1996) § 20.2 (b) n. 8, and sources cited therein; Van Wyk et al., Rights and Constitutionalism (1994), 268-69. 38 See In re: Munhumeso 1995 (2) BCLR 125 (ZS) 130 (noting that freedom of expression served the purpose, inter alia, of “help[ing] an individual to achieve self-fulfilment”); Van Wyk, supra note 17, 269 (“Every individual has the right (and duty) to seek his or her own ‘truth’, whether it objectively exists or not, in order to develop as a human being.”); Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression, 6 (“freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual self-fulfilment. The proper end of man is the realisation of his character and potentialities as a human being. For the achievement of this self-realisation the mind must be free . . . [t]o cut off [a person’s] search for truth, or his expression of it, is to elevate society and the State to a despotic command . . . and to place [her or him] under the arbitrary control of others.”) Emerson’s words resonate with those of Ackermann, J., in Ferreira v Levin NO; Vryenhoek v Powell NO 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) 28 (“An individual’s human dignity cannot be fully respected or valued unless the individual is permitted to develop his or her unique talents optimally. Human dignity has little value without freedom; for without freedom personal development and fulfilment are not possible.”) 39 See S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) 675, para 10 (an individual provision of Chapter 3 must be construed “in its context, which includes . . . other provisions of the Constitution itself and, in particular, the provision of Chapter 3 of which it is part.”) (per Chaskalson, P.) Compare Mandela v Falati 1994 (4) BCLR 1 (W) 8 (“In a free society all freedoms are important, but they are not all equally important. Political philosophers are agreed about the primacy of the freedom of speech”) (per Van Schalkwyk, J.) With respect to the learned judge, it may comport better with the both the spirit and the structure of our Constitution to understand each of the various enumerated rights contextually, as interrelated and mutually supporting articulations of the values that underlie the document, rather than to attempt to rank individual rights in any particular hierarchy. 40 Respectively articulated in sections 14, 13 and 10 of the Constitution. 15