NGCOBO J [30] Much of the argument in this case, and of the evidence placed before this Court, was directed to the question whether the interests of society would be better served by legalising prostitution than by prohibiting it. In a democracy those are decisions that must be taken by the legislature and the government of the day, and not by courts. Courts are concerned with legality, and in dealing with this matter I have had regard only to the constitutionality of the legislation and not to its desirability. Nothing in this judgment should be understood as expressing any opinion on that issue. [31] I agree with O’Regan and Sachs JJ that the appeal against the finding made by the High Court concerning brothels should be dismissed. However, I conclude that section 20(1)(aA) is not unconstitutional. In view of the fact that I also agree with the conclusion reached by my colleagues, that section 20(1)(aA) does not violate the right to privacy, freedom and security, and the right to economic activity, it follows that I not only dismiss the appeal, but also decline to confirm the order of invalidity made concerning section 20(1)(aA). Order [32] It now remains to consider what the appropriate order should be. The orders made by the High Court were made conditional upon the confirmation of the order of unconstitutionality made by the High Court. As I hold that the impugned provisions are not unconstitutional and therefore decline to confirm the order of unconstitutionality, it follows that the order made by the High Court upholding the appeal by the third appellant cannot stand. In the High Court, and indeed in the Magistrates’ Court, the appellants did not dispute the fact that they had contravened the impugned provisions. They only challenged the constitutionality of these provisions. Nor 15