O’REGAN J and SACHS J human dignity and personhood of women. [66] The question that next arises is whether section 20(1)(aA), to the extent that it constitutes indirect discrimination, is unfair or not. In determining whether a discriminatory provision or conduct is unfair, one must look at the nature of the group discriminated against, the nature of the discriminatory provision or conduct, as well as the impact of the discrimination on those who complain of it. It is women and, in particular, prostitutes who suffer the discrimination in this case. There can be no doubt that they are a marginalised group to whom significant social stigma is attached. Their status as social outcasts cannot be blamed on the law or society entirely. By engaging in commercial sex work, prostitutes knowingly accept the risk of lowering their standing in the eyes of the community. In using their bodies as commodities in the marketplace, they undermine their status and become vulnerable. On the other hand, we cannot ignore the fact that many female prostitutes become involved in prostitution because they have few or no alternatives. Accordingly, we cannot exclude from the constitutional enquiry into fairness the fact that although prostitutes do constitute a vulnerable group, this is due in some part to their own conduct. [67] It might well be that in many situations it will be easier to establish the fairness of indirect discrimination than that of direct discrimination. Thus, the injury to the dignity of members of a group on whom the measure happens to target differentially might be less severe than if they had been targeted by direct discrimination. The fact that in theory if not in practice the male customers are equally liable for prosecution as accomplices could also attenuate the differential impact, and hence limit the extent of the unfairness. On the other hand, the salient 40