O’REGAN J and SACHS J mean that even though section 20(1)(aA) does not render the client’s conduct criminal, the fact that it is rendered criminal by other provisions would mean that there is no discrimination. [62] Section 18(2) of the Riotous Assemblies Act provides: “Any person who – (a) conspires with any other person to aid or procure the commission of or to commit; or (b) incites, instigates, commands, or procures any other person to commit, any offence, whether at common law or against a statute or statutory regulation, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to the punishment to which a person convicted of actually committing that offence would be liable.” We will assume that both this statutory provision and the common law render a client who employs the services of a prostitute to be guilty of an offence as a co-conspirator, or as an accomplice, respectively. [63] Even on that assumption, however, it seems to us that the effect of section 20(1)(aA) remains discriminatory. For, as counsel for the Gender Commission cogently argued, the section brands the prostitute as the primary offender of the actual offence. The offence of the customer becomes an offence of conspiracy or complicity. The difference between being a principal offender and an accomplice or co-conspirator may have little impact in formal legal terms. It does, however, carry a difference in social stigma and impact. In imposing a direct criminal liability for the prostitute, the law chooses to censure and castigate the conduct of the prostitute directly. The indirect criminal liability on the client, assuming there is such, flows only from the crime committed by the prostitute who remains the primary offender. The primary crime and the 38