implication of these ingredients is that the appellant is only guilty of the offence of rape if the concurrent findings to that effect by the two Courts below are based on evidence that the appellant knowingly had sexual intercourse with PW1, without her consent. From the record of this appeal, PW1, appellant's victim, was three years at the time of the rape which fact necessitates reminding the learned appellant's counsel the import of the clear and unambiguous words that constitute Section 39(c) and more particularly Section 282(1)(e) of the Penal Code. The Sections provide:- "39 (c) A consent is not such a consent as it intended by any Section of this Penal Code, if the consent is given- (c) by a person who is under fourteen years of age." "282(1) A man is said to commit rape who, save in the case referred to in Subsection (2), has sexual intercourse with a woman in any of the following circumstances- (e) with or without her consent, when she is under fourteen years of age or of unsound mind." From the foregoing, PW1 is incapable of giving valid consent to any act of sexual intercourse under scrutiny pursuant to Section 283 of the Penal Code. It is sufficient under the law to convict the appellant on evidence that establishes sexual intercourse only between the two. Proof of PW1's consent being irrelevant is unnecessary. The finding of the trial Court at page 76 of the record and the lower Court's affirmation of the finding on the point at page 167 remain unassailable." Per MUHAMMAD, J.S.C. (Pp. 14-16, Paras. B-A) (...read in context) 8. EVIDENCE - ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE: What determines the issue of admissibility of evidence