was stated that the Court has to consider amongst others, the nature and seriousness of the offence, the circumstances of the offender and the interests of society. [10] I now proceed to deal with the defence’s submission that the court a quo did not have the jurisdictional powers to try the accused because she was a Magistrate of second class. In this connection, my simple answer is that the Act itself prescribes such a procedure in terms of section 31 (2). In addition, section 293 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 6 carries a similar provision. This means that the magistrate was within her statutory powers to try the accused and to commit him for sentence. Thus, this submission falls aside. [11] With respect to the issue of delay which was similarly raised in another case in which the accused was committed to this Court for sentence, 7 I find it convenient to quote my remarks therein in which I stated as follows:“While I do accept that by spending one (1) year and three (3) months in prison while awaiting his trial the accused did suffer prejudice, I am also of the opinion that in the light of the seriousness of the offence, the prescribed sentence and the fact that sexual offending is one of the worst scourges of abuse against the vulnerable section of society especially young children, the prejudice can be mitigated in the sense that the custodial sentence to be imposed should in the final 6 7 Act No. 9 of 1981 R v Tumelo Monesa CRI/S/4/10