FRONEMAN J benefit of further argument on the issue.3 The result I arrive at is, I believe, an application of the substantive normative considerations pioneered in K. The traditional language of vicarious liability [92] The conventional understanding of vicarious liability is described in the following terms by Nugent JA in the majority judgment in this matter in the Supreme Court of Appeal: ―Vicarious liability has a long but uncertain pedigree. In essence it may be described as the liability that one person incurs for a delict that is committed by another, by virtue of the relationship that exists between them. There are two features of vicarious liability in its traditional form that are trite, but they bear repetition. The first is that vicarious liability arises by reason of a relationship between the parties and no more—it calls for no duty to be owed by the person who is sought to be held liable, nor for fault on his or her part. The second feature is that it is a secondary liability—it arises only if there is a wrongdoer who is primarily liable for the particular act or omission.‖4 (Footnotes omitted.) [93] This traditional formulation may imply that there is no normative link between the conduct of the innocent employer (―it calls for no duty to be owed by the person who is sought to be held liable, nor for fault on his or her part‖) and the culpable conduct of the employee (―a delict that is committed by another‖), only a factual relationship (―by virtue of the relationship that exists between them‖). But that is not correct. There must be some normative connection or link between the delict and that 3 Although I am of the view that a direct liability enquiry will yield the same result in relation to wrongfulness, as that arrived in relation to ―close connection‖ in the main judgment, the potential defence relating to an ultimate finding of negligence in a direct liability enquiry may require a referral to the High Court – see [125] and [148] below. 4 Minister of Safety and Security v F 2011 (3) SA 487 (SCA) (Supreme Court of Appeal judgment) at para 15. 36