FRONEMAN J also conceivable that evidence could be presented by the state that it took reasonable steps, through the instrumentality of other state officials, to prevent the wrongful and negligent conduct of the state official directly involved, and that accordingly an ultimate finding of negligence is not warranted.62 [126] With these general comments in mind it is now necessary to return to the case before us in order to examine whether it should be decided on the basis of direct state delictual liability. Issues on the pleadings [127] At the start of this judgment,63 I indicated that the pleadings and evidence justified deciding the case on the basis of direct liability, subject to further argument from the parties on the issue, which might have necessitated referring the matter back to the High Court.64 Because this route has not been taken, I will refer to the facts and issues covered in the pleadings and evidence as briefly as possible. [128] The case was pleaded in the conventional manner, namely that Mr van Wyk acted within the course and scope of his employment with the first respondent (Minister) and that this made the Minister liable for the damages sustained by the applicant. Although this is the conventional way of pleading vicarious liability, it is not necessarily the legal conclusion in the pleadings which determines the real issues 62 This additional safeguard to the state appears not to be available if its liability is vicarious in the traditional sense. 63 See [91] above. 64 As was done in Carmichele (CC) above n 46 at para 84. 52