FRONEMAN J [143] Mr van Wyk was in the position to offer the applicant a lift that night by virtue of his access to police resources, particularly the possession of a police vehicle. That occurred because of his status as a detective and the fact that he was on standby duty.76 [144] All these factors are relevant in objectively assessing whether there was a legal duty, arising from general and particular state obligations, to protect those who place their trust in the police (especially vulnerable children and women). The fact that Mr van Wyk did not consider himself to be on duty, and that he intentionally disregarded any possible obligation not to cause harm negligently to the applicant, makes matters worse, not better. [145] In Gore,77 Cameron JA and Brand JA examined the relevance of state of mind in the determination of wrongfulness: ―We do not think that it can be stated as a general rule that, in the context of delictual liability, state of mind has nothing to do with wrongfulness. . . . In the language of the more recent formulations of the criterion for wrongfulness: in cases of pure economic loss the question will always be whether considerations of public or legal policy dictate that delictual liability should be extended to loss resulting from the conduct at issue. Thus understood, it is hard to think of any reason why the fact, that the loss was caused by dishonest (as opposed to bona fide negligent) conduct, should be ignored in deciding the question. We do not say that 76 The High Court noted that Mr van Wyk confirmed during his testimony that ―the unmarked vehicle had been allocated to him for the purpose of fulfilling his stand-by duties.‖ F v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2010 (1) 606 (WCC) SA at para 15. 77 See above n 46. 58