MOGOENG CJ ultimately eradicate that widespread challenge. “All forms” is so all-encompassing that its reach or purpose seems to leave no form of violence or application of force to the body of another person out of the equation. To drive the point home quite conclusively, the Constitution extends the prohibition to violence from “either public or private sources”. [43] It is necessary to emphasise that in terms of our law, the application of force, including a touch depending on its location and deductible meaning, or a threat thereof constitutes assault. And parental authority or entitlement to chastise children moderately and reasonably has been an escape route from prosecution or conviction. This means that the violence proscribed by section 12(1)(c) could still be committed with justification if that parental right is retained. But, if it is accepted that what would ordinarily be criminally punishable, but for the common law defence of moderate and reasonable chastisement, is indeed what section 12(1)(c) seeks to prevent, then children would be protected by that section like everyone else. One would be hard-pressed to suggest that assault, which chastisement however moderate or reasonable is, does not fall within the catchment area of section 12(1)(c). “All forms of violence” means moderate, reasonable and extreme forms of violence. Besides – “a culture of authority which legitimates the use of violence is inconsistent with the values for which the Constitution stands.”36 [44] This proscription does put an end to any argument, however sound, that might be raised on any ground in support of the retention of the defence of reasonable and moderate parental chastisement. For there are indeed sound and wisdom-laden, faithbased and cultural considerations behind the application of the rod. That said, parental chastisement of a child, however moderate or reasonable does, in my view, meet the threshold requirement of violence proscribed by this constitutional provision and, therefore, limits the right in section 12(1)(c). The conclusion that it cannot escape the reach of section 12(1)(c) is inevitable. 36 S v Williams [1995] ZACC 6; 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC); 1995 (7) BCLR 861 (CC) at para 52. 16