convicted of the offence. She argued that the offence charged does not come within the purview of those offences for which corroboration is required under section 179(1) & (5) Evidence Act and it is only the evidence of an unsworn child as envisaged by section 183 Evidence Act that requires corroboration as a matter of law. She argued that this section does not apply to the case in hand as PW2 at the time was 13 years and she gave evidence on oath. She nonetheless conceded that in cases of this nature corroboration is only desirable and the judge only needs to warn himself before convicting the accused. In this particular case Learned counsel asserted that the Judge was conscious of such warning before convicting the appellant on the evidence of PW2. Learned counsel went on to argue that the evidence of PW2 was amply corroborated by pieces of evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses, especially the evidence of PW5, PW3, and PW1 who said he found that PW2 had forceful penetration of the genital tract associated with attempted strangulation. She therefore contended that these pieces of evidence corroborated the evidence of PW2 that she was raped by the appellant. Since the appellant was actually seen in the school premises she argued, he had the opportunity to commit the act and he was apprehended and taken to the Police Station soon after the incident happened on 24/5/89. Making further submissions, learned counsel asserted that the prosecution established without doubt that there was unlawful carnal knowledge and submitted that the slightest degree of penetration is sufficient to establish carnal knowledge and that neither rupture of the hymen nor emission of semen need be proved. She referred to Brett & Maclean 2nd Edition page 757 paragraph 1966 for this proposition. On issue of consent, she submitted that the conduct of PW2 clearly showed that she did not give consent to the act since the appellant held her neck and threatened to shoot her on her face coupled with the fact that she struggled with him before she ran away. There is also the evidence of PW1 who found swelling and linear abrasions on the front and sides of PW2's neck. She therefore submitted that the injuries sustained by PW2 support the fact that she did not give consent. Whether the appellant actually carried a weapon or not, the threat of such nature would be sufficient to frighten a child into submission. On the argument by appellant's counsel that PW2 ran to Mrs. Irene Osagie and said one man wanted to rape her which suggested that PW2 was never raped, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that PW2 a young child of 11 years did not appreciate what happened to her as this was her first experience and the evidence of DW3 did not negative that of PW1 who found that there was penetration. She contended that the failure of PW1 to examine the appellant so as to confirm whether he had same venereal disease as was found in PW2 is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. She pointed out that