7 approach adopted by Van Heerden J in S v Blaauw 2001 (2) SACR 255 (C). [7] In Blaauw, Van Heerden J suggested that a Court was not obliged in terms of s51(3)(b) to impose the minimum sentence on a child who at the time of the commission of the offence was 16 or 17 years old unless the State satisfied the Court that the circumstances justified the imposition of such a sentence. In Nkosi (at 141 g-j), Cachalia J held: ‘The distinction between s51(3)(a) and s51(3)(b) lies in the nature of the discretion that a court has when considering the positions of the two classes of offender. In the former case a Court should ordinarily impose the prescribed sentence unless there is some weighty justification for the imposition of a lesser sentence. The Legislature has therefore limited the discretion of a Court to depart from the minimum sentence (see S v Malgas (supra para [25]…)). In the latter case there is no reference at all to substantial and compelling circumstances. The express wording of the section only requires a Court to justify a decision to impose the prescribed sentence by entering its reasons on the record. It does not limit a Court’s discretion to impose an appropriate sentence on this class of offender’. [8] Makwetsja, like the majority in the court a quo, declined to subscribe to the interpretation of the section advanced in Blaauw and Nkosi. The reasons advanced in each instance for not doing so may be summarised as follows: Whilst the statutorily prescribed minimum sentence should be imposed on offenders between the ages of 16 and 18 only in extreme cases, that did not mean that the Legislature did not