VAN DER WESTHUIZEN J [15] However, one has to look a little deeper into the history and reason behind the principle of res judicata before concluding that it is an absolute bar to the granting of leave, even in a case like this which possibly involves the sentencing of a child. Historically, its use was mainly to prevent the difficulties that might arise from discordant or contradictory decisions in the same suit.14 In the context of civil matters it operates in tandem with the so-called “once and for all” rule that a plaintiff may generally only claim for damages arising out of the same cause of action once.15 But, under our Constitution, there may be scope for situations in which the res judicata principle is softened in relation to unrepresented accused persons. When unrepresented persons apply for leave to appeal, without necessarily properly knowing their rights and what arguments may be available to them, it could be unduly harsh to preclude them from subsequently applying for leave to appeal where they may have a valid point, particularly where there is a possible violation of one of their rights protected in the Bill of Rights. [16] Furthermore – and closer to the facts of this case – the present application does not necessarily call for a decision on the merits which may contradict the previous decisions of this Court. Both the 2008 and 2009 applications were dismissed on the basis that this Court did not regard it as “in the interests of justice” to hear the matter. The merits of the applicant’s specific claim in the present application, namely that he was a child when he committed the offences and that the sentencing Court did not take 14 See Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 44.2.1 translated by Gane The Selective Voet (Butterworth & Co. (Africa) Ltd., Durban 1957) at 553. 15 Custom Credit Corporation (Pty.) Ltd. v Shembe 1972 (3) SA 462 (AD) at 472. 8