29 know is that the legislation clearly anticipated that people would be charged with offences under the Act and, after conviction, would be sentenced. In the absence of any provision in the Act governing penalty the necessary implication is that this was to be left to the general discretion of the courts in terms of their powers under s 276(1). [37] In addition Parliament has, since the judgment of the high court was delivered, met and passed an amending Bill, 45 that expressly provides that the powers of courts in regard to sentence for the offences in chapters 2, 3 and 4 of the Act are those specified in s 276 of the CPA.46 Whilst this Bill still awaits the assent of the President it nonetheless provides a clear example of subsequent legislation constituting a ‘legislative declaration’ of the meaning parliament wishes to have ascribed to earlier legislation. 47 Whilst I do not suggest that this principle can be used to afford a meaning to legislation that it is not otherwise capable of bearing – that would amount to retrospective legislation – it is appropriate to invoke it in this case where the Act clearly aimed at creating offences and ensuring that the courts sentence those they convicted of those offences. In addition the amending Bill says that its purpose is to provide expressly that the imposition of penalties for certain offences in terms of the Act is to be left to the discretion of the courts. That accords with what I regard as the 45 Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 2012 (B19/2012). 46 It inserts the following section in the Act: 56A (1) A court shall, if— (a) that or another court has convicted a person of an offence in terms of this Act; and (b) a penalty is not prescribed in respect of that offence in terms of this Act or by any other Act, impose a sentence, as provided for in section 276 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No. 51 of 1977), which that court considers appropriate and which is within that court’s penal jurisdiction. (2) If a person is convicted of any offence under this Act, the court that imposes the sentence shall consider as an aggravating factor the fact that the person— (a) committed the offence with the intent to gain financially, or receive any favour, benefit, reward, compensation or any other advantage; or (b) gained financially, or received any favour, benefit, reward, compensation or any other advantage, from the commission of such offence.’ 47 Patel v Minister of the Interior & others 1955 (2) SA 485 (A) at 493A-D; National Education Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town 2003 (3) SA 1 (CC) para 66.