NGCOBO J commercialised sex include criminalisation, regulation and abstention. [26] The means employed by the state to address these problems are to criminalise commercial sex and brothel keeping. This is prima facie sanctioned by subsection (2). Measures intended to eliminate the harmful effects of prostitution and brothel keeping are clearly measures designed to protect and improve the quality of life. It is not for this Court to pass judgement on the effectiveness or otherwise of the choice made by the legislature. Indeed we are not entitled to set aside legislation simply because we may consider it to be ineffective or because there may be other and better ways of dealing with the problem. It follows therefore that prostitution and brothel keeping are not protected by section 26. For these reasons I agree that the challenge based on section 26 must likewise fail. The Challenge based on privacy [27] It was contended that the prohibition on prostitution infringes the right to privacy. I have grave doubts as to whether the prohibition contained in section 20(1)(aA) implicates the right to privacy. This case is different from National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others.12 There the offence that was the subject of the constitutional challenge infringed the right of gay people not to be discriminated against unfairly, and also their right to dignity. It intruded into “the sphere of private intimacy and autonomy which allows us to establish and nurture human relationships without interference from the outside community” and in doing so affected the sexuality of gay people “at the core of the area of private intimacy.” None of those considerations are present here. 12 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC); 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC). 13