hypothesis than that of his guilt particularly as all doubts must be resolved in favour of the accused. Having carefully read through the various briefs of arguments filed and having also carefully considered the totality of evidence adduced before this Court, it seems to me that only one issue stands out for determination in this case, and that is, whether the accused had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix? The prosecution in urging me to answer this question in the affirmative has placed heavy reliance on the extra-judicial statements of the accused person made to the police after his arrest. These statements which are pure confessions of the offence of rape were later retracted by the accused person during the trial. In urging me to answer this question in the negative the defence has contended forcefully that the inability of the prosecutrix to testify in support of the allege rape meant that there was no evidence that could be corroborated at all. Learned defence counsel submitted that by virtue of section 180 (2) (a) of the Evidence Act, the court must seek for corroboration of the evidence of the prosecutrix in sexual offence cases. This submission in my view is misconceived. Section 180 (2) (a) of the Evidence Act simply provides thus; “…a court shall not in the following cases, act on uncorroborated evidence … (a) cases of rape and other sexual offences against the complainants;” (emphases mine). 4