did not show anything that Accused had sex with PW2 (prosecutrix). That PW2 said the Accused’s ex – wife, Yusufa and Dawda knew about the sexual encounter but were not called to testify by the prosecution. On the meaning of corroboration, defence Counsel cited Section 179 of the Evidence Act, 1994 and stated that Section 180(2) of t5he Evidence Act (supra) mentioned rape as one of the offences requiring corrobaration. Counsel further argued that there must be an independent testimony direct or circumstantial which confirmed in some material particular not only that the offence of rape was committed but that it was the Accused who committed it. She cited the case of AKPANEFE V. THE STATE (1969)1 ALL NLR 420, where it was held that the Court cannot convict on a charge of rape without corroboration. Counsel further contended that for a piece of evidence to amount to corroboration, the following 3 variables must co – exist: 1. There must be independent evidence from where a reasonable inference can be drawn. 2. The evidence must confirm and support in some material particular the evidence that needs corroboration. 3. The corroborated evidence should connect the relevant person with the offence in question, claim or defence. And that such corroborative evidence must establish sexual intercourse between the prosecutrix and the Accused without consent. The cases of THE STATE V. ABDOURAHMAN JALLOW CRIMINAL CASE NO. HC.178/12/CR/061/AO and B. V. BASKERVILLE(1916)2 KB 658 at 667 were cited in support. Counsel also contended that there must be medical evidence to corroborate the evidence of PW2 (prosecutrix) that she sustained injury (ies) on her private part or other parts) of her body which might have been occasioned in a struggle, semen’s stains on her clothes or the clothes of the Accused. The JUDGMENT – THE STATE VS MUSA KEITA 27/7/2016 Page | 5