appellant. According to him the finding of distress made by the trial Judge was not supported by the evidence of the prosecution. On the issue of consent, he submitted that the evidence of the prosecution did not negative consent and so even if the accused had sexual connection with the prosecutrix, there is no evidence on record to support that she did not consent to the act. He contended that the age of the prosecutrix cannot be used to negative consent because in rape cases age is not a relevant factor for the determination of consent. He argued in the alternative that even if age is relevant to ascertaining whether the prosecutrix consented, her age was not strictly proved. It is learned counsel's argument that the case of the prosecution suffers a great set back as a result of their inability to cross-examine any of the defence witnesses and the evidence given by these witnesses tallies with the appellant's testimony to the effect that the prosecutrix's father insisted that the police should prosecute him for demanding money from him (complainant's father) in the presence of his friend, an action which he felt was embarrassing. He submitted that where the story of the accused is not challenged, the defence ought to be accepted by the trial court and where a court disbelieves an accused, the court must give a strong reason for so disbelieving. He finally submitted on the first issue that the evidence adduced in the trial court cannot ground a conviction for attempted rape because there is no proximate act of the appellant established by the prosecution that can constitute an attempt. He argued that the mere fact that the prosecutrix told D.W.3 that somebody wanted to rape her does not of itself import attempt. Making his submissions on issue No.2 learned counsel stressed that the omission on the part of the prosecution to carry out a test on the appellant to ascertain the state of his health with respect to venereal disease created a gap in the prosecution's case and relied on Okoyomon v. The State (1973) 1 All NLR (Pt.1) 16 (1972) 1 SC 21 for his submission. It was his view that the trial court placed the burden of proving his innocence on the appellant before the prosecution could prove its case and this is tantamount to a denial of fair hearing. He contended that this is a misdirection and submitted that where the trial court misdirects itself as to the onus of proof of the guilt of the appellant and subsequently convicts the appellant, an Appeal Court is bound to set aside the judgment as being contrary to the constitution. He therefore urged us to set aside the conviction of the appellant and to discharge and acquit him. In her reply to issue No.1 learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the case of rape was proved beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant by the overwhelming evidence adduced by the prosecution. She stated that the accused/appellant was charged under section 358 of the Criminal Code and corroboration of P.W.2's evidence is not required as a matter of law before the appellant could be