MOGOENG J [21] The majority‘s reasoning was thus based on an understanding that the finding of vicarious liability in K was premised only on the fact that the policemen in that case had committed a delict of omission. This they did by failing to protect Ms K while they were on duty and under an obligation to do so. [22] The majority judgment rejects any notion that a policeman could be said to be ―engaged in the affairs or business of his employer‖ 12 when he commits rape or that rape could even be regarded as an ―improper mode‖13 of exercising the authority conferred on him by his employer.14 The majority also reasoned that the positive delictual act of rape was not one of the bases for the outcome in K. That is how the majority judgment distinguished K from this case. The decision of the High Court was, for these reasons, set aside. [23] Maya JA, writing for the minority,15 said that although the rape had nothing to do with the performance of Mr van Wyk‘s official duties, there was a sufficiently close link between his acts for personal gratification and the business of the police service. Ms F was induced to trust, and accept a lift from, Mr van Wyk because he was a policeman. The minority found that he had placed himself on duty when he undertook to take Ms F home. 12 SCA judgment above n 1 at para 16. 13 Id at para 37. 14 Id. 15 With Bosielo JA concurring. 9