MOGOENG J In the Supreme Court of Appeal [20] Nugent JA, writing for the majority,10 held that the state was not liable because— a. The conclusion in K that the state was liable was based only on the delictual omission of the on-duty policemen involved. b. An intentional delictual commission like rape cannot attract the state‘s vicarious liability. Accordingly, K, properly understood, held that the state was not vicariously liable for the positive delictual acts of the police officials, but only for their acts of omission. And the same should obtain in this case. Because Mr van Wyk was not on duty,11 he, unlike the policemen in K, could not be considered to have been engaged in the business of the police service and to have breached his duty to protect Ms F when he committed the rape. c. An off-duty police official has no duty to protect members of the public and cannot therefore be held personally liable for his or her failure to protect a victim of crime from the harm that occurs in his or her presence. This is so because the police do not have an ongoing duty to protect members of the public. And in the absence of a duty on Mr van Wyk to protect Ms F from harm while he was off duty, there could be no personal liability on him for omitting to do so. 10 With Snyders JA and Pillay AJA concurring. 11 In determining this, the majority held that standby duty means that a police official is off duty until called upon to resume duty. In relation to the claim that a police official is under duties of a ―continuing nature‖ the majority maintained that the fact that police officials may exercise police powers whilst off duty, and have a discretion to determine whether or not to do so, is not equivalent to having an obligation to exercise powers. 8