on appeal before us, these two cases were tried with juries. In Reynolds the conviction was set aside on the grounds that the issue of competence of the young witness to give evidence and indeed, her evidence were tried or taken in the absence of the jury, i.e. after the jury had been asked to retire. In setting aside the conviction in that case, the Lord Chief Justice (Goddard L.C.J.) observed thus:"It should be regarded as most exceptional that any evidence should be given in a criminal trial in the absence of the jury." , Â Â Earlier on in the judgment (i.e. in Reynolds, Supra) the Court had observed that it was important that the jury should hear the child's, answers to questions put to her to ascertain her competency to take oath so as to assist them to come to a conclusion as to the weight they should attach to the evidence of the child. The Court further stated:_ "A fortiori, the jury should be present when a witness is called to assist the Court by telling the Court what his or her experience of the child is, and what impressions he or she has formed of the child's character. The jury will then have before them all the available information with regard to the child's reputation or character for truthfulness. " Â Â Similar observations occur in Southern, supra (especially per Talbot J. at page 13 of the report). So much is clear from these cases and others of the like; the opinion about the child-witness is the "opinion of the Court" and it is easy to see why the jury should also know these facts. When a judge sits alone the position is entirely different and he is preeminently the person whose opinion is relevant. And, apart from this, there is a long line of authorities establishing that competency is not a matter of age but of understanding and that if a child understands the nature of an oath, the provisions in question are completely out of place. See Reg. v. Perkins (1840) 9 C. and P. 395 (or 173 E.R. 884); also R. v. Michael Moscovitch (1924) 18 Cr. App. R. 37. We do not think that the English authorities support the contention of learned counsel for the appellant on this ground of appeal. Â Â But, although the judge is not bound to hold a preliminary inquiry, he is nonetheless required to form an opinion that the child does not understand the nature of an oath in order to make the section operative. The section has approached the problem in a negative way and obviously says nothing concerning the child produced and tendered as a witness who understands the nature of an oath. The section is aimed at a child who does not understand the nature of an oath and what it then says is that the unsworn evidence of such a child may be received despite the provisions of section 179 if "in the opinion of the court" he has sufficient intelligence to justify his giving such evidence and understands the duty of speaking the truth. As the section does not contemplate a child who understands the nature of an oath, it is difficult to see how section 182 applies to the present case. We think it appropriate to