"181.-(1) Any court may on any occasion, if it thinks it just and expedient, receive the evidence, though
not given upon oath, of any person declaring that the taking of any oath whatsoever is, according to his
religious belief, unlawful, or who, by reason of want of religious belief, ought not, in the opinion of the
court, to be admitted to give evidence upon oath.
(2) The fact that in any case evidence not given upon oath has been received, and the reasons for the
reception of such evidence, shall be recorded in the minutes of the proceedings."
  Manifestly, therefore, the duty imposed on the court by section 181(2) to record the reasons for
departing from the provisions of section 179 is clearly seen in the wording of the section. Strangely
enough, there is no such duty imposed on the court by section 182 which on a fair reading has clearly
left the whole matter to the "opinion of the court." We do not think that it is right to contend therefore,
as learned counsel for the appellant has done, that the court has a duty to make a preliminary inquiry
and to record it. On this point, learned counsel had referred us to the provisions of section 38 of the
Children and Young Persons Act of England and to cases which were decided on the interpretation and
application of that section. Section 38 of the Children and Young Persons Act, 1933 (23 Geo. 5 c. 12)
provides:"38. (1) Where in any proceedings against any persons for any offence, any child of tender years called
as a witness does not in the opinion of the court understand the nature of an oath, his evidence
may be received, though not given upon oath, if, in the opinion of the court, he is possessed of sufficient
intelligence to justify the reception of the evidence, and understands the duty of speaking the truth; and
his evidence, though not given on oath but otherwise taken and reduced into Writing in accordance with
the Provisions of section 17 of the Indictable Offences Act, 1848, Or of this part of this Act, shall be
deemed to be a deposition within the meaning of that section and that Part respectively:
Provided that where evidence admitted hy virtue of this section is given on behalf of the prosecution the
accused shaIl not be liahle to be convicted of the offence unless that evidence is corroborated by some
other material evidence in support thereof implicating him.
(2) If any child whose evidence is received as aforesaid wilfully gives false evidence in such
circumstances that he would, if the evidence had been given on oath, have been guilty of perjury, he
shall be liable on summary conviction to be dealt with as if he had been summarily convicted of an
indictable offence punishahle in the case of an adult with imprisonment", and in his argument, learned
counsel for the appellant had submitted quite properly that cases like R. v. Reynolds (1950) 34 Cr. App.
R. 60 and R. v. Southern (1930) 22 Cr. App. R. 6 were decided on the basis of this section. Unlike the case