the age of that person and for that purpose may take such evidence as may be forthcoming at the time, or at the time to which the enquiry may be adjourned but an order or judgment of the court shall not be invalidity by any subsequently proof that the age of that person has not been correctly stated to the court and the age presumed or declared by the court to be the age of that person shall for the propose of this law be deemed to be the true age of that person." "368(3) Where an offender who in the opinion of the court, had not attained the age of seventeen years at the time the offence was committed is found guilty of a capital offence, sentence of death shall not be pronounced or recorded but in lieu thereof, the court shall order such person to be detained during the pleasure of the Governor and if so ordered he shall be detained in accordance with the provisions of Part 44 notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any written law. In the case of Modupe v. The State (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt. 87) 130 at p.142, this court held that where the age of the accused person is material for the purpose of conviction or relevant in the determination of the nature of the sentence and evidence of such age is not conclusive, the trial Judge is obliged to make due inquiry as to the age of that person by taking evidence of such age. It was also held in the case of George v. The State (1991) 9 NWLR (Pt. 214) 199 that where there is evidence before the trial Judge that the appellant was 17 years old at the time of commission of the offence, the need to resolve the issue of appellant's age no longer arises. In the instant case, the appellant's age as reflected in his statement to the police (exhibit B) is 20 years. But in exhibit A, the report of the consultant psychiatrist (P.W.5) the age of the appellant as at 28th April, 1988 when the report was written is 18 years. The offence was committed on 5th February, 1987. Learned counsel to the appellant has reasoned that if the appellant was 18 years old in April 1988, he would have been under 17 years old in February 1987 when the offence was committed. There was therefore, a discrepancy as to the true age of the appellant. This, in my view, ought to have prompted the learned trial Judge to conduct an enquiry to ascertain the actual age of the appellant at the material time as envisaged by section 208 of the Criminal Procedure Law. Learned counsel for the respondent has conceded, quite rightly, that since it was doubtful that the appellant had attained the age of 17 years when he committed the offence, that doubt ought to be resolved in his favour. On this score alone, this appeal succeeds with respect to the death sentence pronounced on the appellant. The appeal is allowed. The death sentence passed on the appellant is set aside and in its place, the appellant is ordered to be detained at the pleasure of the Governor of Edo State. KUTIGI, J.S.C.: I read before now the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Edozie, JSC. I agree with him that there were discrepancies in the age of the appellant as reflected in exhibits A and B both tendered by the prosecution which make it doubtful whether or not the appellant was 17 years old when the offence was committed. I will also give the benefit of doubt to the appellant and allow the appeal on sentence only. I therefore set aside the death sentence passed on the appellant and order him to be detained at the pleasure of the Governor of Edo State.