51 escaping from the appellant. It is therefore in our view nothing more than a cynical attempt on the appellant’s part to claim that he harboured a belief that when the complainant ran away, she did so out of sheer modesty, and his reliance on the customary practice is entirely misplaced. [89] He claimed in defence of the charge of trafficking that her family was fully aware of his intention to bring her to Cape Town and had not objected to her relocating with him. Moreover, the trial court did not find, on a careful examination of the evidence relating to the relocation and correctly in our view, that the complainant had consented to the customary marriage, the incidents of sexual intercourse with him, and that she had willingly relocated to Cape Town. The appellant claimed though that the complainant had willingly relocated from the Eastern Cape to Cape Town and his reliance on the fact that her family and uncles in particular could have exercised such consent on her behalf is irreconcilable with his claim that she had in fact consented. [90] With the helpful insights of the experts on the practice of ukuthwala and submissions of the amici, it became apparent during the appeal that the offences for which the appellant was charged took place after a “traditional” ukuthwala would have occurred; this is because the trafficking and sexual assaults occurred after the customary “marriage”. Therefore the appellant could not in any event have placed reliance on the practice of ukuthwala (in the traditional sense) as justification for his conduct. However what he did