SKWEYIYA J bearing “not only . . . the right to intervene in order to prevent [a] violation of the Constitution, but also . . . the duty to do so.”10 The discharge of this solemn duty necessarily entails the exercise of broad powers. However, in Doctors for Life this Court recognized: “Courts must be conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority and the Constitution’s design to leave certain matters to other branches of government. They too must observe the constitutional limits of their authority. This means that the judiciary should not interfere in the processes of other branches of government unless to do so is mandated by the Constitution.”11 The consideration of constitutional issues in vacuo is typically entrusted to the legislature. This is so both because of the legislature’s democratic legitimacy and also because of the particular competence of that branch of government in addressing polycentric issues. [222] It follows, then, that the core responsibility of the judiciary is to resolve live disputes on the basis of evidence presented by opposing parties. Indeed, this Court in Zantsi, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Borowski v Canada, set out the rationale for this as follows: “First, in an adversary system, issues are best decided in the context of a live controversy. The second consideration is based on concern for judicial economy and the last is that it is generally undesirable and possibly an intrusion into the role of the 10 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [2008] ZACC 19; 2009 (1) SA 287 (CC); 2009 (2) BCLR 136 (CC) at para 33. 11 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others [2006] ZACC 11; 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) at para 37; 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) at 1417D-E, cited with approval in Glenister above n 10 at para 34. 112