NGCOBO J justice on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the need to protect the child by holding proceedings in camera where necessary. [137] The criticism directed at the High Court’s failure to have regard to the provisions of section 153(3A) is misplaced. So too is reliance on that provision to answer the High Court’s difficulty with section 153(3). Section 153(3A) concerns the exclusion of the public from criminal proceedings involving a sexual offence while the child complainant is giving evidence. This subsection does not require proceedings to continue in camera after the child complainant has completed his or her testimony. The exclusion of the public from the entire proceedings is regulated by section 153(3) which makes the exclusion dependent upon a request by the parent or guardian of the child complainant. It is this subsection which was the target of the High Court and the amici. [138] Section 153(3) provides that the court has a discretion whether to “direct that any person whose presence is not necessary at the proceedings or any person or class of persons mentioned in the request, shall not be present at the proceedings”116 (emphasis added). By contrast, section 153(3A) provides that the public shall not be present at criminal proceedings involving a sexual offence while the complainant is giving evidence. But the subsection does not require the entire proceedings to be held in camera: it requires only that the proceedings be held in camera “while [the complainant] is giving evidence”. Its sphere of operation is therefore limited to the 116 Section 153(3) of the CPA. 71