NGCOBO J intermediary. Similarly, it would be absurd to expect a child of that age whose only testimony relates to identifying his or her stolen cellular phone to testify through an intermediary. Yet a child who is of the same age who is a complainant in a rape case, who is shy and was severely traumatised by the rape, may need the services of an intermediary. The exercise of judicial discretion enables the court to apply the provisions in a flexible manner bearing in mind that the primary objective is to give effect to the provisions of section 170A(1) and section 28(2) of the Constitution. [126] The exercise of discretion conferred by section 170A(1) is, however, circumscribed. Its exercise is constrained by the Constitution, in particular, section 28(2). As has been observed, “[t]he spirit and the tenor of [a] constitution must therefore preside and permeate the processes of judicial interpretation and judicial discretion.”114 It is also constrained by the purpose for which it was conferred: to safeguard the best interests of children. The discretion in the subsection must therefore be exercised with due regard to the objective to protect a child from undue stress or suffering that may arise from testifying in court. [127] In my view, the answer to the problems identified by the amici and the DPP does not lie in making the appointment of an intermediary compulsory in every sexual offence case in which a child complainant is involved. It would not be in the best interests of the child who wishes to confront his or her abuser in court to impose an intermediary on that child. This would ignore the child’s needs, wishes and feelings. 114 S v Acheson 1991 (2) SA 805 (NmHC) at 813. 66