10 with caution (R v Manda 1951 (3) SA 158 (A) at 163C; Woji v Santam Insurance Co Limited 1981 (1) SA 1020 (A) at 1028B–D); and that the evidence in a particular case involving sexual misconduct may call for a cautionary approach (S v J 1998 (2) SA 984 (A) at 1009B). For reasons which will presently emerge the present case is plainly one which calls for caution.’ [13] In Stevens v S [2005] 1 All SA 1 (SCA) para 1 this court cautioned: ‘Courts in civil or criminal cases faced with the legitimate complaints of persons who are victims of sexually inappropriate behaviour are obliged in terms of the Constitution to respond in a manner that affords the appropriate redress and protection. Vulnerable sections of the community, who often fall prey to such behaviour, are entitled to expect no less from the judiciary. However, in considering whether or not claims are justified, care should be taken to ensure that evidentiary rules and procedural safeguards are properly applied and adhered to.’ In para 17 it further stated: ‘As indicated above, each of the complainants was a single witness in respect of the alleged indecent assault upon her. In terms of section 208 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, an accused can be convicted of any offence on the single evidence of any competent witness. It is, however, a well-established judicial practice that the evidence of a single witness should be approached with caution, his or her merits as a witness being weighed against factors which militate against his or her credibility (see, for example, S v Webber 1971 (3) SA 754 (A) at 758G–H). The correct approach to the application of this so-called “cautionary rule” was set out by Diemont JA in S v Sauls and others 1981 (3) SA 172 (A) at 180E–G as follows: “There is no rule of thumb test or formula to apply when it comes to a consideration of the credibility of the single witness (see the remarks of Rumpff JA in S v Webber …). The trial judge will weigh his evidence, will consider its merits and demerits and, having done so, will decide whether it is trustworthy and whether, despite the fact that there are shortcomings or defects or contradictions in the testimony, he is satisfied that the truth has been told. The cautionary rule referred to by De Villiers JP in 1932 [in R v Mokoena 1932 OPD 79 at 80] may be a guide to a right decision but it does not mean “that the appeal must succeed if any criticism, however slender, of the witnesses’ evidence were well-founded” (per Schreiner JA in R v Nhlapo (AD 10 November 1952) quoted in R v Bellingham 1955 (2) SA 566 (A) at 569.) It has been said more than once that the exercise of caution must not be allowed to displace the exercise of common sense.’ (See further all the other authorities referred to therein.)