observe however that where a judge thinks that the case of a child-witness should be taken away from
the provisions of section 182(1), there should be recorded a note to that effect stating that in his
opinion the child is capable of understanding the nature of an oath. A child is a young person in the
formative period of life and whilst it is easy to see that a person of the age of 6 or 7 years does not
understand the nature of an oath, it is impossible to be categorical on the capability or otherwise of a
child of the age of 13 years or more to understand the nature of an oath. A great deal depends on the
opinion of the judge who sees and hears the witness. Where the child is incapable of understanding the
nature of an oath, the procedure in section 182(1) must be followed so as to justify the necessary
departure from the provisions of section 179. On the other hand, where the child is capable of
understanding the nature of an oath, he must comply with section 179 as is the case in the present
proceedings.
  The contention of learned counsel for the appellant is, in short, that it must be shown on the records
that the child witness is capable of understanding the nature of an oath before he is allowed to take
such oath. We point out that the section on which learned counsel relies makes no provisions for the
situation postulated by his argument. It is as well the duty of counsel to raise an objection to any
irregularity in the conduct of the proceedings and especially so when it is clear that a particular step
ought to have been taken or a particular thing done. In the present case, the witness, Agnes Okoye, gave
evidence under oath without any objection whatsoever from anybody and as her age does not
necessarily import an incapability to understand the nature of an oath or any other form of
incompetency the section relied upon to attack the proceedings is in our view unavailing.
  We are ourselves satisfied, like the learned trial judge, that the witness, Agnes Okoye, spoke the
truth throughout and that the appellant had lied to the court by saying that all he did was to hold
Mgbankwo Nwuzo by the hand and lead her out of the place. The evidence of Agnes Okoye is supported
by the testimony of Chief Maduka, 1st prosecution witness, to whom the appellant and his relation,
Lawrence Ofurume, had earlier on reported the fight with the deceased and her death thereby. The
doctor who performed the post-mortem examination on the corpse of the deceased found the injuries
exactly where Agnes Okoye stated that the appellant had inflicted them. Even if the witness Agnes
Okoye should not have been sworn and had wrongly been so sworn, we would have held that this is a
case to which we would apply the provisions of the proviso to section 26(1) of the Supreme Court Act
and affirm the conviction of the appellant. This is a clear, simple and straight forward case of murder
brutally committed by the appellant against a helpless woman for no just cause. He had kicked her twice