MOKGORO J possession thereof subject to the protection of the free expression clause of the Constitution? Does Section 15 Protect Sexually Explicit Expression? [19] Applicants’ argument takes for granted that section 15 of the Constitution protects sexually explicit materials. But that is not self-evidently so. It might well be argued that, interpreting the Constitution purposively, the free expression clause should be read to protect speech conveying ideas bearing directly or indirectly upon matters of political importance. It would not be unreasonable to maintain that the particular expressive material with which we are here concerned -- graphic depictions of various forms of sexual activity -- falls outside of that protected category of expression. [20] That, indeed, is an argument that has been well received in United States courts. In Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, the Court held that: There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libellous, and insulting or ‘fighting’ words -those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.29 Although Chaplinsky has been significantly limited in other areas,30 it remains settled law that, once material has been defined as obscene, it forfeits the protection of the First Amendment. 31 29 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (footnotes omitted). 30 E.g., New York Times v Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (“Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the various other formulae for the repression of expression that have been challenged in this Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy the first amendment.”) 31 Miller v California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); see also New York v Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982) (analysing “child pornography as a category of material outside the protection of the First Amendment.”) 11