MOKGORO J what we are presented with here, if we assume in favour of the legislation a defensible core goal, is a statute whose sweep is undoubtedly immensely wider than what the reasonable attainment of any legitimate goal would require, even if we chose to define such a goal as broadly as imaginably possible. [63] One need not go so far as to accept the notion of a preference for free expression over other rights,100 to appreciate the danger of overbroad statutory proscriptions. It is incumbent upon the legislature to devise precise guidelines if it wishes to regulate sexually explicit material. Especially in light of the painfully fresh memory of the executive branch of government ruthlessly wielding its ill-checked powers to suppress political, cultural, and, indeed, sexual expression, there is a need to jealously guard the values of free expression embodied in the Constitution of our fledgling democracy. Other Bases for Applicants’ Constitutional Challenge [64] Applicants’ attack on the 1967 Act as a violation of their rights under the free expression clause of the Constitution was only one of several bases for their attack on that Statute. Applicants also invoked their constitutional right to privacy (section 13), their right to freedom of overbreadth: it is not sufficient that the litigant merely points to limited areas of overbreadth; “substantial” overbreadth must be demonstrated. Thus, for example, in New York v Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), the court rejected an overbreadth challenge of a statute forbidding distribution of explicit sexual materials to persons under the age of 16, where it doubted that “arguably impermissible applications of the statute amount to more than a tiny fraction of the materials within the statute’s reach.” Id. 773. 100 See Mandela v Falati 1994 (4) BCLR 1 (W) 8. Cf. note 38, supra. See also India Express Newspaper (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd v Union of India [1985] 2 S.C.R. 287, 320 (“‘Indeed, freedom of expression is the first condition of liberty. It occupies a preferred position in the hierarchy of liberties giving succour and protection to other liberties.’”) (quoting Second Press Commission Report, Vol. I pp 34-35); Palko v Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (freedom of speech is “the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom.”); Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union, Local 580 v Dolphin Delivery Limited, [1987] 33 D.L.R. (4th) 174, 183 (“Representative democracy . . . is in great part the product of free expression . . .). 36