MOKGORO J characterised as a form of dramatic “art”.33 Moreover, to strip entire categories of speech of constitutional protection by virtue of their content not only flies in the face of the common sense understanding of the meaning of the guarantee of freedom of expression, but would seem also to be antithetical to the fundamental purpose of that guarantee.34 Does Section 15 Protect the Right to Possess Sexually Explicit Material? [24] It might be argued that the free expression guarantee may not be invoked by Applicants, simply because the conduct for which they are sought to be held criminally liable -- possession of indecent or obscene material -- is not expressive activity. That argument is not without force. Section 15 does not appear by its terms to protect the right to receive, hold and consume expressive materials generated by others. 33 I note also that section 15(1) protects “speech and expression”, thus obviating any argument that the Constitution protects only traditional (verbal) political discourse. The pitfalls of categorising speech according to whether it appeals to the emotive, the cognitive, or the rational faculties have been acknowledged in United States jurisprudence. See e.g., Cohen v California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (upholding constitutional right of petitioner to wear in public a jacket bearing vulgar epithet protesting Vietnam war draft: “much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive as for their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall message.”) 34 Cf. R v Keegstra, [1990] 3 C.R.R. (2d) 193, 286 (“the contents of a statement cannot deprive it of the protection afforded by [the guarantee of free expression], no matter how offensive it may be”); R v Butler, [1992] 8 C.R.R. (2d) 1, 27 (“in my view, there is no doubt that [anti-obscenity legislation] seeks to prohibit certain types of expressive activity and thereby infringes [freedom of expression].”) Ronald Dworkin identifies what he calls the “egalitarian” role of the guarantee of free expression, and it is on that basis that he insists that pornography falls under the umbrella of that guarantee, notwithstanding that it is not conventionally understood as “political” in nature. Women and Pornography, New York Review of Books, Oct. 21, 1993, 36: “The First Amendment’s egalitarian role is not confined . . . to political speech. People’s lives are affected not just by their political environment . . . but even more comprehensively by what we might call their moral environment. . . . Exactly because the moral environment in which we all live is in good part created by others . . . the question of who shall have the power to help shape that environment is of fundamental importance . . . Only one answer is consistent with the ideals of political equality: that no one may be prevented from influencing the shared moral environment, through his own private choices, tastes, opinions, and examples, just because these tastes and opinions disgust those who have the power to shut him up or lock him up. . . . In a genuinely egalitarian society, [such] views cannot be locked out, in advance, by criminal or civil laws: they must instead be discredited by the disgust, outrage, and ridicule of other people.” Id. at 41. See also note 37, infra. 13