detained at the pleasure of the Governor of the State." In the course of the trial, the appellant gave evidence of his age, - he said that he was born on 3rd November 1967, which would make him 16 years and one month as at the date when the offence was committed. Although the appellant was rigorously cross-examined on this point, the Prosecution did not produce any contrary evidence that the appellant was older than the age which he had given. In his judgment, the learned trial Judge disbelieved the appellant. He (the Judge) then went on to determine the true age of the appellant from his own personal assessment of the appellant. He eventually found that: "From my own estimation, each of the 1st, 2nd and 7th accused is older than 21 years of age. No doubt evidence on their ages is very material, but I am satisfied that each of them is older than twenty years." (Italics mine) Now, in the first place, the trial Judge found that it is material to have evidence on record to determine the true age of the appellant. The only evidence about age was given by the appellant himself. It was on oath and there was no other evidence to rebut that. The question then is, when the trial Judge said that "I am satisfied that each of them is older than twenty years." one would like to ask from what materials or evidence, did the Judge become satisfied? Obviously he became satisfied, not from the evidence given before him, but from his own estimation of the appellant. In my view, this is a wrong approach to the whole issue. If the Judge felt that the appellant had told lies about his age, he was quite entitled to reject that evidence, but he had no right to substitute his own personal assessment for evidence which should have been given. In those circumstances, if the question of the appellant's age became such an important issue (and in the instant case the Court found as a fact that it was a material issue), the proper step was to make an enquiry to determine the appellant's age under section 208 of the Criminal Procedure Law. The learned trial Judge failed to do this and in my view he erred in Law to have substituted his own opinion for the appellant's age. For this reason the sentence of death passed on the appellant and confirmed by the Court of Appeal was equally wrong in Law. For the fuller reasons set out in the lead judgment, which I adopt as mine, I would allow the appeal, affirm the conviction of murder, but quash the sentence of death passed on the appellant and instead order that he be detained in prison at the pleasure of the Governor of Ondo State. Appeal Allowed. Appearances E B. Nwazojie A.E. Ake Nroye, D.P.P. Ondo State, (with him Adesola Okuyelu, Miss) For the Appelants For the Respondents