at the front seat of the car, but also that there was a tussle between the two. That the phone was eventually recovered from the back seat of the car is eloquent proof that the prosecutrix was thrown into the back seat of the car. I am therefore satisfied that she was forcefully thrown into the back seat of the car by the accused and this I shall hold as a fact. The BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th Edition Pg. 1601) defines violence as “the use of physical force usually accompanied by furry, vehemence or outrage”. The act of throwing the prosecutrix into the back seat of the taxi fits into this definition and therefore amounts to actual violence on her person by the accused, and this I shall also hold a fact. From the foregoing, I am satisfied that the prosecution has also proved the second element of the offence under section 272 of the Criminal Code beyond reasonable doubts. Turning now to the first count brought under sections 121 and 122 of the Criminal Code, I will deal with the issue of corroboration as a preliminary matter. Both statute and case law authorities emphasize the need for some other evidence to support the allegation of contemptuous sex (see section 180 (2) of the Evidence Act and the West African Court of Appeal Case of R v. SEKUN & Ors (1941) 7 W ACA, 10). It is also settled that any corroborating evidence must be extraneous to the evidence of the prosecutrix (see R v. WHITE HEAD (1929) I.K.B 99, 102). 8