prosecutrix and drove away when he saw some people approaching his car. This conduct is not synonymous with that of a person who was demanding for his money from a truculent passenger. From this conduct alone, I reach the conclusion that the accused was doing something wrong. Since I already believe the evidence of the prosecutrix it is easy for me to also reach the conclusion that the wrong act in question was the act of rape alleged by the prosecutrix. The surrounding circumstance therefore presents such compelling and cogent evidence that leads me to the conclusion that the prosecutrix was sexually assaulted by the accused and this I shall also hold as a fact. I have not seen any evidence on record which gives me the slightest impression that the sexual encounter was consensual. I hold on the evidence that it was not. I therefore believe from the circumstances of this case that the prosecutrix did not consent to the sexual intercourse and this I shall hold as a fact. The prosecution and therefore in my view proved the elements of the offence under section 121 of the Criminal Code with the certainty required by law. From the foregoing, I reach the conclusion that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubts on both counts. The accused person MOHAMMED SAMBOU is accordingly convicted as charged on both counts. EMMANUEL A. NKEA JUDGE 12