kind of discrimination against them qua women or girls. This inference can only be drawn from a narrow and restrictive construction of section 180 of the Evidence Act. It is settled law that a statute to be better understood must be read as a whole and not in isolated parts (see the Gambia Court of Appeal Case of ATTORNEY GENERAL v PAP CHEYASIN OUSMAN SECKA (2002-2008) 2 GLR, 73). I have looked at section 180 (2) of the Evidence Act and found that sexual offence cases are just one of the listed categories of cases requiring corroboration. The list includes other categories such as claims against the estate of a deceased person; sexual misconduct in matrimonial causes; perjury; and cases of exceeding speed limits. It is for the above reasons that I am not persuaded by the arguments advanced by counsel. I overrule them. I now return to the crux of the matter in count one. It is essential for me to now determine whether on the evidence it has been established that the accused had contemptuous sex with the prosecutrix after throwing her into the back seat of his car. I have looked at exhibit “B” and it is evident that the hymen was absent, but also that some whitish vagina discharge was present. Although there were no eye witnesses, I must state straight away that I believe the evidence of the prosecutrix in its entirety. The conflicting evidence as to the time she boarded the cab was not material enough to disturb the prosecution case. I believe and accept every material aspect of her evidence as truthful. The learned defence counsel has urged me to hold the absence of injuries on her private organ as proof that there was 10