outside the confines of judicialism by circulating or undulating between 18% and 20%. I do not think that was available to him, again the judge that he is.” Having so found and held as above and in any absence of any supporting evidence before the trial court, I reverse and set aside that finding of the trial court that the Respondent is entitled to a share of the value of the development of the matrimonial property herein as held by the trial judge. Having done this, it is my view under the circumstance that the proper and safest thing to do at this stage is to hold that the Respondent is the owner of the piece of land in question and that the Appellant as found by the learned trial judge has paid significantly for the construction and expansion works that was carried out on the matrimonial home. This is following from the holding of the learned trial judge that where it was practically impossible to precisely calculate the proportions of a party’s contributions to the matrimonial home to enable a determination of their respective shares, the equitable principle that equity is equality will be applied. In the English cases of COKER V COKER (1964) LLR.188 wherein the case of RIMMER V RIMMER (1952) 2 ALL E.R. 863 was referred to, the issue was raised as to whether it was fairly possible to assess the separate beneficial interests of the husband and wife by reference to their contributions to the purchase of a house; it was held in that case thus: “In this case, both husband and wife were wage earners. They brought a house in the name of the husband as the matrimonial house. The wife provided the deposit for the house. The rest of the purchase money was borrowed on the security of a mortgage from a building society in the name of the husband. Part of the principal of the mortgage money was repaid out of the housekeeping money provided by the husband. The remainder was CA – JUDGMENT MATTY FAYE V DAWDA JAWARA Page 16