years. Also common ground is the fact that the Appellant was a teacher in the school where PW6 was a pupil and to whom she looked up to as her guardian in school whom she calls her Uncle. These uncontested, admitted and proved facts alone, as above stated, prove the 2nd ingredient of the offence beyond reasonable doubt that PW6 did not consent to the act, being a child below the age of 16 years of age against whom the act was committed by her teacher/guardian, the Appellant. In the light of the foregoing, I resolve this issue against the Appellant and in favour the Respondent. I now turn to the 2nd issue. On this issue, it was submitted for the Appellant that in the facts and circumstances of this instant appeal, it was inappropriate and the learned trial Judge was in error to have invoked the provisions of Sections 217 and 218 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) to convict the Appellant for the offence of gross indecency because Section 217 draws inspiration from Section 216 and must be read together, the effect of which is that before invoking Section 217, there must be no doubt as to the facts but a doubt as to the law or appropriate charge 31 to be framed as to which of the several offences the facts constitute, citing EDU VS COMMISSIONER OF POLICE 14 WACA 163 at 167and contending that where as in this case, the Appellant was charged with a single offence of rape and without any indication that the prosecution was in any doubt as to the offence the Appellant committed, but at the end of trial it became doubtful that rape was committed, but an offence of a different nature was disclosed, neither the trial Court nor the Appellate Court can substitute a conviction for any other offence, the Appellant having defended only the charge of rape and being misled by the none framing of a new charge. He found support for this preposition in the case of EKECHUKWU VS COMMISSIONER OF POLICE (1966) NNLR 96, AT 101.