It is the appellant's contention that as a minor the victim's evidence needed corroboration. With Pw1's evidence having been sworn, the law dictates and is settled that such evidence of a child needs no corroboration for the Court to act thereon. Again see Daggaya V. State (2006) (Supra). In the circumstance, the appellant is wrong therefore in contending that the testimony of Pw1 had to be corroborated. I seek to say further that for all intents and purposes, the totality of Exhibits 'B' and 'C' is a corroboration of the evidence of Pw1, wherein the appellant confessed and maintained that he had sexual intercourse with the victim (Pw1). In other words in taking exhibits 'B and 'C' read together, the totality will give one explanation, that there was indeed Penetration even though it's not complete, In consequence, the cases cited by the appellant on the proposition that there has to be complete penetration do not support the principle that penetration even if slight would ground conviction. In the case of Jegede V. The State (supra), it was held that "whether the prosecutrix was a minor or an adult, there must first be proof of penetration and that penetration of the vagina must be linked with the appellant." Belgore, JSC (as he then was)]. Penetration however slight is sufficient and it is not necessary to prove an injury or the rupture of the hymen to constitute the crime of rape - Kalgo, JSC in Iko V. The State (supra). The two Exhibits 'B' and 'C' are voluntary statements made by the appellant, who did not object to their admissibility in evidence. As rightly held by the two Lower Courts, conviction on them was proper without further corroboration. See the case of Emeka V. State (2001) 5 M.J.S.C P1 at 5. The fact that the victim was under