12 date when the wrong . . . was first brought to the knowledge of the creditor’. He relied on the judgments in Oslo Land Co. Ltd v The Union Government 1938 AD 584 and Administrator of the Transvaal v Crocodile Valley Citrus Estates (Pty) Ltd 1942 TPD 109. In the first-mentioned case it was held (at 592) that in negligence cases the cause of action arises when an unlawful act is committed and damage caused, and as soon as damage has occurred all the damage flowing from the unlawful act can be recovered, including prospective damage and depreciation in market value; further losses do not give rise to further causes of action. The Administrator of the Transvaal case is to similar effect (at 111): ‘a claim for damages does not arise when the person who says he was damaged discovers the damage [but] . . . at the time of the tortious act’. Both these cases were decided on the premise that a wrongful act results in some damage (however minimal) that the creditor is capable of ascertaining. That is the usual case. It was unnecessary to consider the effect on a creditor who, although aware of the facts, did not or could not, at the date of the delict, through no fault of his or her own, appreciate where responsibility for the act lies and thus has no appreciation that he or she is entitled to civil redress against the person who inflicted the harm. That is an unusual case. But it is one which arises squarely in claims based on the sexual abuse of children where the victim is a ‘creditor’ under the 1943 Act. Although unnecessary to decide for the determination of this case, the same appears to hold true for s 12 of the 1969 Act which provides: ‘(3) A debt shall not be deemed to be due until the creditor has knowledge of the identity of the debtor and of the facts from which the debt arises: Provided that a creditor shall be deemed to have