O’REGAN J liable.29 The principle of vicarious liability is not peculiar to our common law, but is also to be found in customary law rules.30 It is clear, therefore, that there is a deepseated sense of justice that is served by the notion that in certain circumstances a person in authority will be held liable to a third party for injuries caused by a person falling under his or her authority. [25] Many cases are straightforward. However, difficulties arise when the delict is committed in the course of a deviation from the normal performance of an employee’s duties. The question the courts have to answer is whether the employee is still acting within the course and scope of his or her duty or is still engaged with the affairs of the employer. The difficulty is particularly pronounced where the deviation itself is intentional and even more pronounced where the deviation constitutes an intentional wrong, such as in the present case. [26] It is clear that an intentional deviation from duty does not automatically mean that an employer will not be liable. In the early leading case of Feldman v Mall,31 a driver of the appellant’s vehicle had, after delivering the parcels he had been Another v Duncan Dock Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd and Another 2000 (1) 827 (SCA) at para 29; Venter v Bophuthatswana Transport Holdings (Edms) Bpk 1997 (3) SA 374 (SCA) at 386A; Tshabalala v Lekoa City Council 1992 (3) SA 21 (A) at 28A-B; Feldman above n 23 at 736; Estate Van der Byl v Swanepoel 1927 AD 141 at 146; Mkize v Martens 1914 AD 382 at 390. 29 Estate Van der Byl v Swanepoel above n 28 at 146. See also ABSA above n 25 per Zulman JA at para 5; Ngobo above n 20 at 827A. 30 Thus, a kraalhead is liable for all the delictual acts of inhabitants of the kraal. See the discussion in Bennett A Sourcebook of African Customary Law for Southern Africa (Juta, Cape Town 1991) at 351ff and Bekker Seymour’s Customary Law in Southern Africa (Juta, Cape Town 1989) at 82ff. 31 Above n 23. 19