FRONEMAN J [114] As we have seen, there are general difficulties in delineating direct and vicarious liability.37 It is the conceptual difficulty of introducing the notion of a legal duty and its secondary breach by the entity sought to be held vicariously liable, that merits further discussion here. [115] In the case of a policeman – a state employee – the existence of a public duty which was breached by that policeman would make the state directly liable for the reasons already discussed.38 If the breach was not of a public duty, but a purely private one unconnected to his or the state‘s public obligations, the traditional understanding of vicarious liability, based on the short-hand ‗course and scope‘ rule, may result in the state being secondarily liable without more – ―it calls for no duty to be owed by the person who is sought to be held liable, nor for fault on his or her part.‖39 But how could the breach of public duties by other state organs constitute vicarious liability in that situation? If there was a breach of public duties by them it would amount, again, to direct liability of the state. [116] Given these difficulties, the creation of risk, vulnerability of young people and women, public trust in the police and the accountability of the state appear to me to be somewhat at odds in determining the secondary, vicarious state liability where they are insufficient to establish a public duty on the primary wrongdoer. These are factors 37 See [104]-[105] above. 38 See [109] above. Whether the merely negligent breach of a public duty by a state official would make the official personally liable as well, is something that need not be considered here. Compare Neethling ―Liability of the State for Rape by a Policeman: The Saga takes a new direction – Minister of Safety and Security v F 2011 (3) SA 487 (SCA)‖ (2011) 32 Obiter 428 at 437. 39 In the words of Nugent JA, Supreme Court of Appeal judgment above n 4 at para 15. 46